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ABSTRACT

Revolutionary leaders of Virginia, the state with the
most extensive western claims, considered it their
responsibility to help direct congressional land policy.
This study of Virginia and the West focuses on the influence
of Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and George Washington on
United States territorial policy, 1780-1787.
Within this
paper their opinions are used to represent the spectrum of
political thought in Virginia toward the West.
Their
contributions are traced through an analysis of the
Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787, with particular emphasis
on the last.
All three men agreed that new states should be created
in the West.
They differed on how to develop these new
states so that they would be a positive addition, rather
than a hindrance, to the Union.
They also wished to
strengthen the links between Virginia and the West.
The thesis concludes with an explication of the
Ordinance of 17 87 emphasizing how it addressed the perceived
problems of the time.
It also analyzes how the territorial
ordinances reflect changing attitudes toward the strength
and character of the central government.

vi

VIRGINIA AND WESTERN TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, 1780-1788

CHAPTER I
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CONFEDERATION PERIOD

The most common map in American history textbooks is
that of the nation's westward growth.

When we view today's

United States, criss-crossed by Interstate highways and
bound by an ever-present mass culture, the earlier
expansion of the nation takes on an aura of inevitability.
This perspective, however, obscures the contemporary
debates and uncertainty that accompanied the republic's
geographic growth.
At the close of the Revolution in 1783, the United
States had no western territories.

Instead, the future

national domain was imperfectly divided into the
overlapping claims of individual states.

Within seven

years, however, the United States had both a national
domain and a plan for its governance.

That plan, the

Ordinance of 1787, was to form the basis of U. S.
territorial policy through the following century.

The

ordinance was the product of many minds, but the leaders of
one state, Virginia, were instrumental in determining the
shape of western policy during the 1780s.

Virginia, as the

state with the most extensive western claims, strongly
influenced the nation's western policy.

The views of her

leaders toward the West were, in turn, shaped by a
2
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combination of political philosophy and personal ties with
the West.
The following essay will first explore the views of
three Virginians who represented the general range of
political opinion in their state toward the nation's
western policy during the 17 80s, namely, Thomas Jefferson,
James Monroe, and George Washington.

The opinions of

others will be considered to the extent that they affected
the outlook of these men.1

The final chapter will

explicate the Ordinance of 1787, emphasizing how it
addressed the perceived problems of the time and
highlighting portions of the ordinance not discussed
e arlier.

American Revolutionaries were aware of the fragility of
their victory over the British Empire.

While some

advocated continental expansion for the new republic, most
thoughtful Americans were more patient.2

They believed

that the example of Roman history had proven the danger of
mixing an empire and a republic.

They expected to use

peaceful persuasion and example, rather than military
force, to accomplish the spread of republican ideals.

Thus

they supported the provision in the Articles of
Confederation that allowed Canadians to join the union if
they elected to do so, two unsuccessful invasions having
proved that the issue could not be forced.
This conviction, that the United States lacked the

4

military strength to conquer Canada, also caused some
leaders to doubt the ability of the United States to
maintain control the trans-Allegheny West.

Though these

territories had been formally acquired by the Treaty of
Paris of 1783, it was feared that what had been won through
diplomacy and bluff would be lost by distance and bullets.
British troops were still in possession of the Northwest
posts.

Spain quickly proved to be a fair-weather ally as

it moved to negate American claims through its control of
the Mississippi.

Both European powers were, in American

eyes, overly friendly with the Indians.
The Confederation's western policy was further clouded
by the doubtful loyalty of Americans already settled west
of the Alleghenies.

Colonial and state legislatures had

experienced difficulty in controlling their immediate
hinterlands.3

It was feared that the trans-Allegheny

region--what was then the far West--would prove even more
problematic.

This uncertainty led the Confederation

government to debate almost all aspects of western policy.
The Revolutionary generation tended to view the West
and its people along two broad dichotomies.

First, the

region could be seen as either a westward extension of the
eastern states by liberal interpretation of colonial
charters or as the foundation of a new national domain won
through the common sacrifices of the states.

Second,

western settlers were believed to be either an independent
society existing in a state of nature or a subordinate
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society--the newly independent Americans were reluctant to
use the word colony--in need of guidance and protection.
Of the two views of the region itself, the first tended to
predominate in states with western claims, the so-called
"landed" states.

Opposing them were the "landless" states

with limited bounds and no western claims, which wanted to
prevent the potentially vast "landed" states from gaining a
disproportionate influence in national affairs.

"Landless"

states preferred to see the West as part of a common prize
won during the Revolution.

Views along the second

dichotomy, the human and political landscape, were less
easily predicted, depending as they did more on political
temperament than on state loyalties.
The debate over the future of the West was formally
resolved with the passage of the Ordinance of 1787,
commonly known as the Northwest Ordinance.

This ordinance

set forth the guiding principles of United States
territorial policy for the next century.

At its most basic

level the ordinance provided for a territorial government
for the newly settled western regions.

Though based on

colonial principles, the territorial government was the
first step to the granting of full statehood and inclusion
of new states in the Union as equal members.

At its most

symbolic, the ordinance laid the foundation for what Thomas
Jefferson later called an expanding "empire of Liberty."4
The importance of the ordinance is often overshadowed
by the far greater importance of the Constitution.

The
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Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia easily outshone
what was left of the Confederation Congress meeting in New
York City.

History has been far kinder to the attendees of

the former than to those of the latter.

But while

historians have often trivialized the Confederation
Congress in comparison to the Constitutional Convention,
they have usually linked the Ordinance of 17 87 with the
Constitution in their interpretations.

It was John Adams

who originally connected the two in importance; these "two
authorities," he said, provided the means by which the
organization of the republic might be concluded "with
unexpected dignity."5
However, where Adams found "unexpected dignity,"
historian Staughton Lynd discovered a duplicitous bargain.
Lynd suggests that the famed anti-slavery article of the
ordinance was one half of a purely sectional deal.

In

return for northern support of the three-fifths clause of
the Constitution southern delegates at the Confederation
Congress agreed to the banning of slavery in the Northwest
Territories through Article Six of the ordinance.6

Paul

Finkelman adds to L y n d 's argument by noting the
inconsistencies between Article Six and the rest of the
ordinance.

He implies that with neither funds nor power

provided for its enforcement, Article VI was merely a
cosmetic addition to an ordinance that otherwise fully
protected the property of the slave holder.7
Other historians focus on real, rather than chattel,
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property.

Through comparison with Jefferson's Ordinance of

1784, Merrill Jensen portrayed the later ordinance as a
victory for land speculators--with the prize being the
millions of acres sold to the Ohio Company for as little as
ten cents an acre.

According to Jensen,

it was the earlier

ordinance that "provided for democratic self-government of
western territories,

and for that reason it was abolished

by the land speculators and their supporters."8
Arthur Bestor described the Ordinance of 1787 as a
repudiation of the liberal Jeffersonian principles of its
predecessor.

He considered similarities between the

Ordinance of 1784 and its successor of 1787 to be mostly
superficial.9

Not all historians agreed.

For Robert F.

Berkhofer, Jr. the "1787 document [was] more an extension
and replacement than a repudiation of the Ordinance of
1784."10
These interpretations may be partially resolved by
looking, not at the two ordinances, but at the governments
that framed them.

The relative freedom granted by the

Ordinance of 1784 was necessary because the government to
which the potential new state would belong--the
Confederation--was considered by its framers to be
appropriately weak.

In December 1783, just before he

submitted the report describing the Ordinance of 1784,
Jefferson wrote that "the constant session of Congress can
not be necessary in time of peace."11

Under these

circumstances it is not surprising that the chairman of the
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committee on western lands felt it necessary to give the
new states of the West as much free rein as possible.
Western states were to be perpetual members of the
Confederation, not the union as we now know it.
The weakness of the Confederation was corrected by the
Constitution when many of the powers formerly left to the
states were given to the central government.

Regardless of

whether members of Congress knew of the specific debates
taking place in Philadelphia,

they were aware of the mood

of the Constitutional Convention.12

The strength of the

proposed national government made possible an enlarged role
for the central government in territorial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .1 ^
The Ordinance of 1787 took advantage of this while
retaining the promise of republican equality once statehood
was achieved.

Historians have debated everything from the authorship
of the ordinance to its constitutionality.14
they have followed a well-trodden path.

In doing so

No aspect of

western policy was agreed upon by the leaders of the early
republic.

Passage of legislation did not simplify the

matter; almost every provision for the realization of
western policy was likewise challenged.

While sectional

interests played an important role in setting the
parameters of debate, the character of dissent was often
defined by ideological criteria.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Virginia.

Most

9

Virginians recognized the inevitability of western
settlement.

An expansive settlement pattern was one of the

better-known traits of their state.

But acknowledgment of

the situation did not lead to consensus on an appropriate
response.

The most pressing question to Jefferson, Monroe,

and Washington was not whether the West should be settled
but rather how to govern the West and integrate it into the
Union once such settlement had taken place.

10

NOTES TO CHAPTER I
^-Among these men were James Madison and Richard Henry
Lee of Virginia and Nathan Dane of Massachusetts.
Madison
usually agreed with Monroe.
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within the Jefferson, Monroe, Washington, spectrum.
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Loyalist Perception and Other Essays (Columbia, S.C.,
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203-204.
5John Adams, "A Defense of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States of America--(1787-1788),"
in Adrienne Koch, e d ., The American Enlightenment: The
Shaping of the American Experiment and a Free Society (New
York, 1965), 267.
8Staughton Lynd, "The Compromise of 1787," in Lynd,
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Y o r k , 1950), 354.
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18Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Jefferson, the Ordinance
of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial
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231-262.
11Jefferson to Marbois, Dec. 5, 1783, in Julian P.
Boyd, e d ., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 22 v o l s . to date
(Princeton, N.J., 1950- ), VI, 374.
Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress
1941), 692-693.

1^Edmund

York,

(New

13Only minimal changes .were necessary to bring the
ordinance into agreement with the new national government.
Congress acted quickly to assure "that the ordinance . . .
continue to have full effect," by passing it again during
its first session. See Act of August 7, 1789, in Francis
Newton Thorpe, e d ., The Federal and State Constitutions, 7
vols. (Washington, 1909), 2:963-64.
14F0r an excellent discussion of the historiography
and the historical reputation of the Ordinance of 1787, see
Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the
Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington, Ind., 1987), 133-152.
One of the first critics of the constitutionality of the
Northwest Ordinance was James Madison.
He charged in The
Federalist, No. 38 that the Confederation Congress had
assumed unfairly its power to legislate for the western
regions.
The Northwest Ordinance had been enacted "without
the least colour of constitutional authority." See Edward
Gaylord Bourne, e d ,, The Federalist: A Commentary on the
Constitution of the United States (New York, 1947), 254.

CHAPTER II
VIRGINIA AND THE WEST, 1780-1787:
THE VIEWS OF JEFFERSON, MONROE, AND WASHINGTON

More than most travelers, Thomas Jefferson kept up with
his correspondence.

As newly appointed American minister

to Paris, he relied on letters to keep posted on the latest
developments in Congress as well as in Virginia.

On June

23, 1786, he might very well have reflected on how little
was new on the other side of the Atlantic.

His latest

communication from James Monroe contained little good news.
Congressional business was at a standstill with few members
in attendance.

Money troubles continued, and yet another

series of Indian treaties had been signed, though it was
unclear if these would be any more successful than their
predecessors.

The debate over western lands had also been

resurrected, a new form of government having evidently been
proposed.

But what was Monroe saying?

of government]

"It [the new form

is in effect to be a colonial government

similar to that which prevailed in these States previous to
the revolution."1
Monroe did not provide Jefferson with a great deal of
detail about the proposed changes.

The size of the new

western states was to be increased, thereby decreasing
their total number to only three or five.
12

In addition,
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Congress was to appoint all senior territorial officials.
The most important difference between the American and
British territorial systems, according to Monroe, was that
American territories would eventually be "admitted into the
confederacy."

While no vote had yet been taken on the

proposed changes, Monroe believed that the new plan was
"generally approved" by his fellow c o n g r e s s m e n .^
Jefferson's response was polite yet insistent.

He

feared that many congressmen supported Monroe's plan for
the wrong reasons.

To formulate a policy based on the

needs and potential benefits of the "maritime states" was
an exercise in bad faith.

Instead, Jefferson argued that

Congress should "state the question in it's just form, How
may the territories of the Union be disposed of so as to
produce the greatest degree of happiness to the
inhabitants?"3

There was little agreement as to the role of the
western territories.

Gouverneur Morris argued that the

undeveloped West should be kept in a state of dependence,
similar to that which the thirteen states had recently
escaped.

Others opposed western settlement for fear that

the eastern states would never be able to effectively
control the strong-willed frontiersmen.4

Some, such as

Jefferson, acknowledged that the backcountry might be
uncontrollable but felt that the West not the East, should
direct its own destiny, even to the point of political
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independence.5

Though Jefferson and Monroe disagreed on

some aspects of western policy, they and other Virginians
always assumed that the West should be part of the Union or
at least a closely allied sister republic.

Their

disagreement was over how best to secure the West to the
Confederation.

Tied to this were their diverse appraisals

of the West and its people.
Congressional disagreement over the relationship
between East and West, or between old states and new, was
the principal reason for the differences between the
Ordinance of 1784 and its successor of 1787.
was not, however, very well informed.

The debate

Most members of

Congress had not ventured beyond the Alleghenies.

Their

image of the West was based on faulty maps, travelers'
accounts, and their own wishful thinking.

For some members

the real West existed only in the speculative certificates
of land companies.

For others it was a region defined by

negatives--a lawless wasteland, lacking in books, towns,
roads, and other amenities of civilization.
Although Jefferson had never visited the region, his
interest in it was well known.

By the time of his second

election to the Continental Congress in 1783, he was a
recognized authority on western issues.6

It was not

surprising that he took part in drafting both Virginia's
cession of her western lands and the Ordinance of 1784 for
the governance of the same.

The latter, in particular,

generally regarded as his handiwork.

is

While the full extent
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of his contribution is debatable, as chairman of the
committee on western lands he doubtless concurred in the
general features of the ordinance.
The cession and the ordinance share traits that are
traceable to the influence of Virginia.

A number of

Virginians were on the congressional committee of western
lands, where they protected the interests of their state.
They did so by assuring that Congress closely adhered to
the restrictions included in the Virginian cession:

first,

that the West should be divided into small states conducive
to a republican form of government; second, that these
states should be admitted into the union as equals; third,
that the western lands should be used for the benefit of
all Americans,

rather than being monopolized by

speculators.7

This last stipulation was particularly in

Virginia's interest, as most land companies were based in
other states, notably Maryland and Pennsylvania.8
Under the Ordinance of 1784 the West was to be divided
into small states of approximately 15,000 square miles,
their boundaries based on lines of latitude and longitude.
Settlers would be responsible for their own government in
the earliest stage, the only restriction being that it must
be based on the constitution of one or another of the
original thirteen states.
population of 20,000,

When a state achieved a

it would receive permission from

Congress to form a permanent government.

The state would

be eligible to join the Confederation when its population
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equaled that of the "least numerous of the original
thirteen."^
The ordinance concluded with an enumeration of the
principles upon which "both the temporary and permanent
governments

[were to be] established."

The new states were

required to be perpetual members of the Confederation and
their "respective governments" were to be "republican."
They were also subject to the Articles of the Confederation
in the same manner as the original thirteen,

including

responsibility for

a full share of the federal debt.

They

were restricted in

their powers to tax federal property,

and the property of nonresidents was to be taxed at the
same rate as residents.
formed

...

"The preceding articles

. . .

a charter of compact" and were to "stand as

fundamental constitutions

. . . unalterable . . . but by

the joint consent" of Congress and the respective states.10
As soon as the Ordinance of 1784 was passed, work began
on a supplementary

ordinance to facilitate the sale of

western lands.

early as 1776 Jefferson had attempted

As

to

amend the proposed Articles of Confederation to allow
Congress full control over Indian lands purchased in the
territories--a process that would have initiated the
creation of a national domain.

Lands purchased by Congress

were then to "be freely given to those who may be permitted
to seat them."11
considered,

This proposal was. never seriously

and Jefferson was overruled by the pressing

needs of the Confederation treasury.

Money troubles
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continued to plague the new nation into the 17 80s.

Western

lands were seen as a painless panacea that could cure the
ills of congressional finance, and most members of Congress
favored land sales as the most expedient means of reducing
the debt.

Putting a price on the national domain also

protected the investments of land speculators,
several members of Congress.

including

An additional benefit would

be the discouragement of marginal settlers.

Those able to

afford the purchase price should also be able to afford the
price of improvements,

and there would be less danger of

settlers becoming impoverished.
Jefferson's initial draft of the land ordinance called
for a decimal system of land division similar to his more
successful plan for monetary reform.

Congress kept the

overall scheme of the rectilinear survey but rejected
Jefferson's attempt to redefine the familiar, albeit
unwieldy,

acre, mile, and chain into decimal units.12

In

this more modest form Jefferson's proposal was adopted as
the Land Ordinance of 1785, which initiated a program for
the division and sale of western lands.

Two goals of the

ordinance were to provide a structure for the sale of
public lands and to prevent boundary disputes and title
conflicts through a standardized system of rectangular
surveys.
The Ordinance of 17 84 was never implemented.

This was

not due to any deficiencies of the ordinance but rather to
the relative lack of settlement northwest of the Ohio.

The
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blame for that shortcoming must rest with Congress and its
failure to adequately support the Land Ordinance of 1785.
Though enacted later, the Land Ordinance was meant by its
framers to be a prerequisite to the earlier ordinance.
Without the regulated settlement made possible by the
survey system of the Land Ordinance, the orderly society
envisioned by the Ordinance of 17 84 would not be possible.
As Congress quibbled over the details of western policy and
searched hopelessly for adequate funding to implement those
policies agreed upon, men more familiar with the West
warned that time was running out.

In a letter to Richard

Henry Lee, George Washington noted that it was impossible
to "stop the road" of western migration, though it was in
the power of Congress to "mark the way."
warned,

if Congress hesitated too long,

But, Washington
it would soon "not

be able to do either."15
During the 17 80s Kentucky was the principal area of
settlement in the trans-Appalachian West.

Jefferson was

well aware of the rapid growth occurring in these
westernmost counties of Virginia.

A surge of migration

increased the population from a few hundred to more than
75,000 in just over ten years.14

Viewing Kentucky as the

norm, Jefferson saw the duty of Congress to be fairly
straightforward— the formal establishment of new states
followed quickly by their incorporation into the Union as
equal members.15

The thousands of people already settling

in the West would initiate their own local governments and
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institutions.

If Congress would set forth the conditions

of statehood, westerners themselves would take care of
meeting those conditions.
The simple legislation of the Ordinance of 17 84 was not
adequate, however, to solve the nation's problems in the
Northwest territories.

Whereas Kentucky was quickly

maturing, the Northwest appeared destined to remain a
chaotic frontier for much longer.

Squatters were swarming

to the north shore of the Ohio, upsetting already delicate
Indian relations.

Most of the tribes in this region had

sided with' the British during the Revolution,

and it was

feared that they would do so again, especially with British
troops still in possession of the northwestern posts
despite American diplomatic protests.
It is doubtful that the Confederation government was in
a position to occupy these forts even if the British had
complied with the peace treaty.

The prevailing fear of a

standing army coupled with the distrust of a strong central
government and a general war weariness combined to limit
military actions.16

When the British did voluntarily

withdraw from their post on Penobscot Bay in Maine,
Washington had no choice but to ask the Massachusetts
militia to occupy it.

The forces of the United States were

unable to do so because the "few troops remaining in
service" and the "great distance of Penobscot
prevent[ed]

. . . totally

[his] sending a Detachment to receive

possession of that Garrison from the British."17

Some
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members of Congress were doubtful whether the United States
should occupy the northwestern posts because of the
"inconveniences arising from the great distance [to] the
posts, their exposed situation and the expense attending
them."18

Even the French inhabitants of the Illinois

country, who admitted the sovereignty of the United States,
had to beg Congress to provide them with a proper
government.19
It was also becoming clear that Spain intended to block
another American right promised by the Treaty of 1783--free
navigation of the Mississippi.

This closure would not only

damage western trade but also polarize opinion within the
Confederation as the carrying states of the northeast
squared off against the agricultural South and West in a
debate colored entirely by sectional interests.

By the

most simple definitions of sovereignty, the United States
was not in full control of its national domain.

Immediately after the passage of the Ordinance of 1784
Jefferson went to Paris, where he replaced the aging
Franklin as American minister to France.

As principal

author of the ordinance and the Virginia cession Jefferson
had been instrumental in securing the acceptance of these
two acts, each of which met the conditions deemed necessary
by Virginia in the surrender of her western claims.

Even

though both acts were ultimately accepted by Congress,
passage was not easy.

Virginia had "insisted on hard
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terms,” and it was only the pressing financial needs of the
Confederation that led to the cession's acceptance.^0
With Jefferson's departure, the task of protecting
Virginia's interests in the West was assumed by Monroe.
During his first congressional term Monroe had served under
Jefferson on the committee for western lands, and in 1784
he succeeded Jefferson to the chairmanship.

The younger

man quickly moved to become personally familiar with the
western territories.

In late July 1784 he journeyed

through western New York to the lower Great L a k e s .

From

there he meant to tour the northwest posts, visit the upper
Ohio country, and return thence to Virginia, but his
itinerary was shortened by Indian hostilities and the
active discouragement of the British, who were still firmly
in command of the northwest posts.21

The following summer

Monroe planned to accompany the congressional peace
commission to the Indian treaty conference at the Falls of
the Ohio.

Once again he was forced to cut short his trip

as a result of the hostility of some tribes and poor
travelling conditions.22

Though abbreviated, these two

trips served as a catalyst to Monroe's revaluation of his
thinking on western policy.
As late as 1783 Monroe's view of the West was quite
similar to Jefferson's.

In October of that year he

"assured" George Rogers Clark that the Virginia legislature
wished "to effect a separation [of the Kentucky
settlements] and erect an independent State westward, as it

22
will enable [Virginia] to economize [her] affairs

. . . and

give [her] greater strength in the federal councils." 22
was much less optimistic after visiting the region.

He

Just

before his second departure in August 17 85, he had
"confess[e d ]" to Jefferson that he doubted the wisdom of
Kentuckian independence, not because that region was unfit
for statehood, but because of the disadvantage such a loss
would bring Virginia.

Not only would a smaller Virginia

lose influence, but her congressional power would be
reduced by the increase in the number of states.

Monroe

also implied that the potentially numerous states of the
Mississippi Valley would ignore the needs of the older
states of the Atlantic seaboard.24
Monroe returned from this second trip West with
increased conviction of the need to alter the plan for
governance of the western territories.

To Madison he

acknowledged his fear that the admission of new states
would result in a confederacy "so fluctuating [that] there
will never be energy or calculation on it either at home or
abroad, every thing will be in a state of incertainty."25
With Jefferson he was slightly less alarmist, writing
instead "of the impolicy of our measures" regarding the
West.26
Monroe was instrumental in altering the Ordinance of
1784 to reflect the conditions he had witnessed.

These

changes provided the "colonial government" he described to
Jefferson in his letter of May 1786.

In that letter,
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however, Monroe did assure Jefferson that the new plan
would preserve the "most important principles of the act,"
namely,, that once the territories reached a minimum
population they would be "admitted into the confederacy" as
equal members.27

This latter point was, without doubt, the

most important aspect of America's territorial policy.
However, through emphasizing the prospective statehood of a
territory,

it is easy to lose sight of Monroe's

prerequisite "colonial government."

Jefferson, who

certainly did not, feared that western settlers would be
unwilling to remain in a confederation that did not provide
for fundamental rights, specifically the right of selfgovernment .
While Jefferson understood Monroe's rationale for
increasing the size and thus decreasing the number of
states, he did not trust the motives of Monroe's
congressional supporters.

The younger Virginian simply

wished to shorten the time necessary to achieve statehood:
by reducing the number of states, any one state would
easily include the territory and the population of three or
four of Jefferson's smaller states and thus be eligible for
full statehood much sooner.28

Jefferson, however, realized

that the question was more than one of size.

Convinced

that small republics were preferable, he also believed that
western settlers themselves preferred smaller states.

Most

of all, he recognized the partisan logic that drove some
members of Congress to support larger states.

By arguing
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for fewer western states, Monroe was inadvertently lending
support to the argument that the West should have less
power and a smaller voice in the national government.
Monroe was soon to realize the same.
Two months later, on July 16, 1786, Monroe advised
Jefferson that some members of Congress wished to go far
beyond merely reducing the number of states: it was
"plainly the policy of these men to . . . keep them [the
western states] out of the confederacy altogether."
"mischievous

Such a

. . . policy" could only be "calculated to

throw [the West] into the hands of Great Britain."29
Through population quotas and other restrictions,
representatives from New England were attempting to
"rescind everything" they had agreed to in the Ordinance of
1784.

Nor were they willing to leave it at that, as Monroe

also warned Jefferson of "an intrigue . . .

to occlude the

Mississippi," closing it to American trade.30
On December 16, 1786, after a three-month leave from
writing due to a dislocated wrist, Jefferson wrote to
Madison expressing his alarm over Congress'

reversal over

the proposed division of western states--making them "fewer
and larger."

Jefferson viewed this, together with New

England's attempt to close the Mississippi,

as a purely

partisan action designed to secure advantage for the
northeastern states.

Together, these measures made the

break-up of the Confederation much more likely.
Jefferson explained,

As

"it might have been made the interests
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of the Western states to remain united with us, by managing
their interests honestly and for their own good.

But the

moment we sacrifice their interests to our own, they will
see it better to govern themselves.

The moment they

resolve to do this, the point is settled.

A forced

connection is neither in our interests nor within our
p o w e r ."31
This concern points to the basic difference between
Monroe and Jefferson over governance of the territories.
Jefferson preferred to see settlers as Americans first.

He

feared that if they were not accorded those rights and
liberties enjoyed in the thirteen eastern states, they
would break away to form their own nation.

His fears

appear more plausible when it is remembered that he
expected most settlers to be drawn from the native-born of
the eastern states.

He was opposed to immigration from

monarchist countries, because he feared that it would "warp
and bias" the direction of American society "and render it
a heterogeneous,

incoherent, distracted mass."^2

Foreign

migrants were likely to prove even more troublesome in the
West.

Native-born Americans, on the other hand, would not

only be well versed in their republican responsibilities
but would also expect to enjoy the same republican rights
as their countrymen in the East.

A West settled by eastern

Americans would require less instruction and less outside
control because its settlers were already Americans.
Monroe and others who had actually visited the West
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tended to disagree, as did the majority of Congress in
1786.

While members of the Continental Line had expressed

an interest in settling veterans together in a new western
state as early as 1783, most settlers were believed to be a
different caliber of people.33

Washington pointedly

described them as a "parcel of Bandetti" who "bid defiance
to all authority."

Worse, they were "skimming and

disposing of the Cream of the Country at the expense [of
those who had] fought and bled to obtain it."34
Washington's concerns were threefold.

As commander in

chief he was well aware that western lands were about the
only compensation the officers and men of the Continental
Army could expect from the beleaguered Congress.

He also

feared an Indian war, doubtless provoked by these irregular
western settlements; Washington did not trust western
settlers to respect the boundary of Indian lands.

To

secure the separation between red and white he proposed "a
Proclamation . . . making it a Felony

. . . for any person

to Survey or Settle beyond the Line" of lands legally
purchased from the Indians.

He further proposed that the

military "should have pointed and peremptory orders" to
enforce the proclamation.35
In effect, Washington was advocating a return to the
British policy of separation attempted with the
Proclamation of 176 3, but his rationale was not limited to
preventing conflict with the Indians.
no disputes

. . . with the Indians

For "even supposing

[or] that it was not
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necessary to guard against . . . other evils," a compact
settlement would still be preferable to allowing "People to
roam over a Country of at least 500,000 Square Miles
contributing nothing to the support, but much perhaps to
the Embarrassment of the Federal Government."36
Washington's views were also colored by his personal
hopes for the West.

Many of the "bandetti" he encountered

were squatters on his own land.

And he, like most men of

property, took a dim view of trespass.

Additionally,

a

compact settlement would help to maintain property values.
Jefferson, by contrast, was much more trusting.

He doubted

in 1784 that settlers were squatting on the north side of
the Ohio.

But if they were, he was sure that "[tjhese very

people will be glad to pay the price which Congress will
ask to secure themselves in their titles to these lands."37
Washington knew better.

Even with the power of the

courts behind him, he found it difficult to evict
squatters.

With his extensive western land holdings, he

had a large personal stake in the West.

By his own

calculations he owned about 40,000 acres just along the
Ohio River.38

As a property owner, he was unwilling to

leave western development to chance.

To strengthen

economic connections, he advocated a system of inland
navigation to link the Ohio with the James and Potomac
rivers.

Not only would this increase the value of his

lands, but the increase in trade would serve to cement the
interests of the West with those of the maritime states,
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particularly Virginia.3^

To maintain political connections

he advocated a strong central government to control the
unruly western "bandetti."40
The views of men such as Washington and Monroe helped
persuade Congress to take a different view of the West.

At

the same time, inhabitants of Illinois were asking Congress
for a stronger government and reminding delegates that not
all western settlers were transplanted Americans.

On June

22, 1784, these Illinoisans petitioned Congress that they
might be permitted to "form a new state."

In addition,

they noted that it would be "necessary for Congress to send
. . . somebody to help . . .

in drawing up a constitution."

This assistance was needed because the inhabitants had
"always been governed by the military" and had "never had
experience with the machinery of a republic."41

Unknown to

Congress, the petitioners, a minority of those living in
Illinois, had misrepresented their region.

While the

Illinois region was officially under a military governor,
the self-reliant French had usually managed their own
affairs,

in much the same manner as colonial New

Englanders.42

But Congress did not know this.

As late as

1787, Madison confessed that the problem of government for
the settlements of Illinois was "a subject very perplexing
in itself;

[one] rendered more so by our ignorance of many

circumstances on which right judgment depends."43

To be

sure the Americans were probably inclined to doubt the
ability of the French to govern themselves.

The humble
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request of the Illinoisans contrasts sharply with petitions
from the upstart "state" of Franklin in western North
Carolina

(now Tennessee).

There the "privileges of

American citizens" were assumed and the Declaration of
Independence was held up as an example to justify their
actions.44
The Franklinites and other separatists wrongly believed
that the Ordinance of 17 84 gave them the right to form
their own governments and then apply to Congress for
admission into the Confederation.46

This was not the

intent of Congress, and the ambiguities that made this
misinterpretation possible were removed from the new plan
of government, the Ordinance of 1787, which also corrected
other perceived deficiencies of the Ordinance of 1784.
Members of Congress had soon began to doubt the wisdom
of Jefferson’s policy of minimal interference in the West,
especially in regard to the northwest territory.46

Rather

than sturdy republican farmers, the national domain seemed
to only attract squatters and other undesirables.
Ordinance of 1784 was clearly inadequate.

The

Distant

territories, where the authority of the United States was
tenuous at best, were not the best place to experiment with
Jefferson's idealistic notions of government.

Most

congressmen were more inclined to accept Washington's view:
Territorial government should reflect the needs of the
federal government,

and, when possible, settlers should be

selected to fit the needs of the government,

rather than
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molding government to meet the needs of backwoods
"bandetti."

Richard Henry Lee described the Ordinance of

1787 as "much more tonic than our democratic forms on the
Atlantic."47

This was necessary, he wrote to Washington,

"for the security of property among uninformed,

and perhaps

licentious people as the greater part of those who go there
are."48

Even those New Englanders who had once opposed

westward migration now advocated the same as a means of
improving the territory.4^

In Virginia the spectrum of thought toward the West may
be neatly symbolized by the opinions of Jefferson, Monroe,
and Washington.

All three men agreed that "new states

. .

. must be the inevitable consequence of emigration to [the
West]."50

They disagreed on the best means of securing

these states to the union.

For Jefferson, the republican

sentiments of westerners would be enough to connect them to
the American republic,

although he did see the need to

promote an economic connection as well; thus his
encouragement of Washington's involvement in improvements
of Potomac navigation.

But Washington was much more

insistent on the importance of this connection.

In

addition to the bond of trade, he also felt that the right
sort of people had to settle in the West.

Unwilling to

trust westerners to do what was best for the United States,
he thought they should to be persuaded to do so, preferably
through legislation,

but by force if necessary.

Monroe,
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through the evolution of his own thought, served as an
ideal compromise between Jefferson's idealism and the more
conservative views of such men as Washington.

Monroe

realized that it was not enough to legislate equality as
the Ordinance of 17 84 had done.

Personal experience

convinced him, like Washington, of the dangers in
Jefferson's hands-off policy, especially during the
beginning stages of territoriality.

The changes he

proposed to Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784 were designed to
give the new states the resources they needed to become
truly equal members of the nation.
Monroe's proposed revisions in territorial government
eventually became the core of the Ordinance of 1787.
Admittedly, his "colonial government" was initially less
democratic than the Ordinance of 1784.
was only deferred, not denied.

But self-government

Jefferson's proposal that

western states should be "free and independent" was widely
accepted by 17 87.51

Additionally, his amendment banning

slavery--rejected by Congress in 1784--was adopted in 1787
by an almost unanimous vote.

Jefferson's idea of a compact

between the old states and the new was also revised and
expanded into the six Articles of Compact of the Ordinance
of 1787.
Washington's concerns with Indian relations were
addressed by both the ordinances of 1785 and 1787.

Through

its requirement of prior survey the Land Ordinance
effectively separated white settlement from Indian lands.
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This same requirement also encouraged compact settlement— a
necessity of good government in Washington's view.

The

Ordinance of 17 87 reminded settlers that only Congress
could lawfully wage war against the Indians.
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CHAPTER III
EXPLICATION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 17 87
It has often been charged that the Ordinance of 1787
was the quintessential product of a bureaucratic committee.
Matters are further complicated by the frequently changing
membership of the committee responsible for the ordinance.
From 1784 until 1787 a total of thirteen men served on this
five-member committee.1

These "different" committees would

often rearrange the work of their predecessors to suit
their own views of western policy.

The various working

drafts of the ordinance at times appear almost unrelated.
The text of the final document is a reflection of these
changing priorities.

However, the underlying principles

were essentially those intended by Jefferson and Monroe.
Lack of direction is most evident than in the
organizational scheme of the ordinance, one of its more
unusual attributes.

The document may be divided into three

sections, but the first section appears to be an
afterthought.
government,

Rather than outlining the territorial

it provides a detailed description of the

inheritance law for those who die intestate.

This section

also includes the brief acknowledgment of the property
rights of the French inhabitants of the Illinois region.
Not until the middle section is the structure of the
37
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territorial government described, along with the duties,
responsibilities,

and terms of office of the governor and

other principal officials.

The six Articles of Compact,

composing the final section, are an agreement between
Congress and the future state governments of the region to
protect the civil rights of the inhabitants.

Section One: Permanent Laws of Inheritance and Property
It is from the standpoint of stability that this oddly
placed section on inheritance gains importance;

in effect

it encouraged widespread land ownership, an important
republican principle.

By it was recognized the right of

all children--of both sexes and including those of previous
marriages--to an equal portion of an estate.
It was not enough for Congress to simply demand that
new states have republican governments, although Article V
of the ordinance did include this prescription.

In

addition, a republican society had to be encouraged.

As

Jefferson and others realized, a wide distribution of
wealth would promote a similar distribution of power.

The

"equal partition of inheritances" was vitally important if
a government were to be "truly republican."2

While

Congress did not advocate a general redistribution of
wealth,

it was quite willing to alter the distribution of

wealth under those circumstances that typically fell within
the sphere of government.
When someone died intestate it was customary for the
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local government to decide the future of his estate.

In

the seventeenth century most of the American colonies
followed the English custom of primogeniture.

However, by

the eighteenth century this practice was subjected to
increasing criticism.

By the time of the Revolution many

colonies had, through custom and statute, replaced
primogeniture with a more equitable distribution scheme.
Still, in most cases the eldest son could expect to receive
a greater share than his siblings, and children from
previous marriages were often neglected.3
The intestate inheritance section of the ordinance
continued the reforms initiated by individual states and
carried them through to their logical conclusion.
early draft of the ordinance

In an

(1786) this section had

included an explicit example that emphasized the right of
daughters as well as sons to an equal share of intestate
property.4

Though the example was removed from the final

draft, the intent to protect the inheritance of all
children remained.
This 1786 draft is also interesting in its arrangement
of the sections.

Appropriately, the description of

officials and their powers is first, followed by the
Articles of Compact

(without Article VI on slavery)

section on intestate inheritance.5
compared,

and the

When the two drafts are

it is apparent that their meaning is the same.

The 1787 version is more concise, but it still retains the
full intent of the 1786 version.

The difference is in
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placement.

The decision to begin the Ordinance of 17 87

with the section on inheritance was deliberate;

it was not

due to the committee's disorganization, nor was it a last
minute addition.

This encouragement of widespread property

ownership was intentionally republican and also eminently
practical,

as good republican legislation should be.

The

widow retained her traditional third, but no advantage was
given to first-born sons or younger brothers.
Methods of conveyance and tenure were simplified as
well.

This greatly facilitated property ownership and

transfer,

an advantage for the family farmer as well as for

the land speculator.6

Nathan Dane, the committee member

responsible for this section, thought it "vastly
important."

And while this section could be repealed upon

achievement of statehood,

it was Dane's intention that the

custom of equitable inheritance "take root in the first
settlement" and thus become "permanent."7
This section also included a clause guaranteeing to
"the french and Canadian inhabitants & other settlers of
the Kaskaskies, Saint Vincents and the neighboring villages
who have heretofore professed themselves citizens of
Virginia,

their laws and customs now in force among them

relative to the descent and conveyance of property."8

This

assurance was not included in either the Ordinance of 17 84
or any of the intervening drafts, though it does partially
replicate one of the conditions of the Virginia Act of
C e s si on .
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This guarantee is reflective of the supremacy of the
national government.

Under the Ordinance of 1784 it was

not necessary to explicitly protect the rights of the
inhabitants because it was assumed that they would do so
themselves.

Jefferson, as a member of both Virginia's

congressional delegation responsible for the cession and
the committee that drafted the Ordinance of 1784, would
certainly have included this clause if he h a d 9thought it
necessary.

There is also a significant difference in the

wording of the Ordinance of 1787 and that of the Virginia
cession.

Where the ordinance only protected certain

property rights, the act of cession stipulated that these
settlers were to "have their possessions and titles
confirmed to them and be protected in the enjoyment of
their rights and liberties."9

Here the settlers were

explicitly protected in rights and liberties beyond those
relating to property.

Such a guarantee in the Ordinance of

1787 would have created conditions under which state laws,
and to a limited extent state sovereignty, would have been
superior to those of the nation.

Under the Ordinance of

1784, which allowed a high degree of local sovereignty,
such a guarantee was not necessary.

Under the Ordinance of

1787 it would have been in conflict with the overall
intention of the ordinance.

Section Two: A Temporary Territorial Government
Rather than leaving settlers to their own devices, the
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Ordinance of 1787 gave Congress a measure of firm control
through the almost unlimited power of the territorial
governor.

His power was especially strong during the

initial stages of territoriality.

As commander in chief of

the militia, the governor could appoint all officers below
the rank of general officer, as well as any magistrates or
civil officers he thought necessary.

Together with three

congressionally appointed territorial judges, he was
responsible for promulgating the legal code of one of the
thirteen original states for use in the territory.

While

this code could be repealed once statehood was achieved,
it was expected that the future state government would
retain the legal system under which it was founded.
Stability and continuity were also assured by a system of
staggered terms for territorial officials.10
After the territory contained at least 5,000 adult
"free male inhabitants," the governor was to authorize the
election of a House of Representatives.

This body would

then nominate ten persons to Congress, of whom five would
be chosen to serve on the Legislative Council.

The Council

and the House, together with the governor, formed the
General Assembly, which elected the territory's single
representative to Congress and was responsible for adopting
laws for the territory,
bills.

as well as initiating all money

As a member of the Assembly the governor could

introduce legislation, and as senior executive officer he
had absolute veto over its acts.

He also had the power to
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"convene, prorogue, and dissolve" the Assembly whenever he
thought such actions "expedient."

These were the powers

described by Monroe as "in effect a colonial government."11
The prerogatives assigned to the territorial governor were
very similar to those of a British imperial governor.
Although the governor's control over the Assembly was
extensive,

it was not unchallenged.

The territorial

delegate elected to Congress, while not allowed to vote,
was permitted to take part in congressional debate.
Presumably, he would also become familiar with Congress,
its personnel, protocol, conventions,

and connections.

As

an elected official, the territorial representative was in
a position of more potential power than the territorial
governor, who was subject to congressional recall at any
time.
After serving as an "apprentice" representative, the
territorial delegate would be an obvious candidate for
election to Congress once statehood was achieved.

Once

again, stability and continuity are the key emphasis.

The

lesser status of territoriality was made much easier to
accept by the built-in provision for its end.

As soon as a

district had a population of 60,000 it was to be admitted
to the union as a full and equal partner with the original
thirteen states.

This clear means of ending territoriality

did much to assuage bitterness over the loss of republican
rights experienced by a citizen moving to the territory
from one of the older states.
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At the same time the territorial status altered the
future state's relationship with the federal government.
Unlike the Ordinance of 1784, which allowed settlers a
greater voice in their own government, thus encouraging a
loyalty to the state potentially greater than loyalty to
the nation, the Ordinance of 1787 first made territorial
citizens subject to the federal government through its
appointed officers.

in this manner, the superiority of the

federal government was clearly established.

Section Three:

A Permanent Bill of Rights

The Six Articles of Compact were intended by Congress
to form the foundation of "all laws, constitutions,

and

governments11 of the territory and to provide for the
"establishment of States" as full and equal members of the
Union.12

Congress also had the option to offer statehood

to a territory before this threshold population was
reached.
Article I.

Religious worship was not to be "molested"

so long as such worship was conducted in a "peaceable and
orderly manner."

Notably, this article did not provide for

complete freedom of religion but only freedom of worship,
qualified in the interests of order.

This was not the

first time religious liberties had been protected in the
old Northwest.

The religious, civil, and property rights

of the French inhabitants had been guaranteed by the state
of Virginia in 1780 when it organized the region into a

45

c ou n t y .13
Article II.

The legal rights of the inhabitants were

fully protected.

Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, moderate

fines, and the right to bail were guaranteed.
unusual punishments" were prohibited.

"Cruel and

Proportional

representation insured that the legislature would be
responsive to the electorate.

The remainder of this

article was devoted to the preservation of property rights;
citizens whose personal property was taken for public use
were to be completely compensated.

It was further

suggested "that no law ought ever to be made,
shall, in any manner whatever,
private contracts,

. . . that

interfere with, or affect

. . . previously formed."

This clause may be the result of congressional concern
over S h a y s 's Rebellion.

Committee member Nathan Dane must

have been painfully aware of this uprising in his home
state.

And as an eastern lawyer he doubtless had little

sympathy for the debt-ridden western farmers.

The disdain

in which they held the legal profession combined with their
readiness to interfere with the due process of law through
the force of arms must have especially damned them in
Dane's eyes.14
Debt relief was a consistent theme of the Shaysites.
In Massachusetts there had earlier been a movement for a
government moratorium on the payment of debts.

Merchants

who would be adversely affected by a debt moratorium
considered such an action to be outside the proper sphere
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of government.

As William Pynchon and others instructed

Springfield's representative to the General Court,

"no

government can possibly have a right to alter private
contracts, already made."15

Living in an economy that

relied heavily on credit, they felt the creditors should be
protected.

By including this clause to protect private

contracts, Congress warned insolvent farmers away from the
volatile frontier.
However,

it was only a warning, not an injunction.

The

phrase "ought not" implies that the framers did acknowledge
that there were indeed times when such drastic measures
might be necessary.

Before the constitutional prohibition

on state interference with contract responsibilities, most
of the thirteen states had initiated some form of
legislative debt relief.
three forms:

Such actions usually took one of

installment laws allowed payments to be

divided and then made over a period of time; stay laws
postponed payment beyond the original contract period; and
commodity laws allowed payment in a specified commodity
rather than in specie.15

Any of these measures would

impair a merchant's ability to do business,
bought on credit.

for he also

When faced with the loss of much of his

expected revenue he would be inclined to agree with
Manasseh Cutler's hyperbolic assessment of S h a y s 1s
Rebellion:
feared,

the "commonwealth" of Massachusetts was, he

"on the very border of anarchy."17

Cutler later

assisted the government by recruiting for General Lincoln's
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army, which marched against the insurgents.18
Cutler's alleged participation in drafting the
Ordinance of 17 87 is one of the minor debates surrounding
it.

Cutler, General Rufus Putnam (who also fought against

Shays) and General Samuel Parsons were the directors of the
Ohio Company.

This speculative enterprise was formed by

several Massachusetts Continental officers for the purpose
of settling veterans and others on the Ohio frontier.1^
In the spring of 1787, while the ordinance was under
consideration,

the Ohio Company petitioned Congress to

purchase several million acres beyond the seven ranges that
had already been surveyed.20

Cutler personally visited

Congress on July 6 to argue the company's position.

While

there, he was given a draft copy of the ordinance upon
which he indicated several changes he would like to see.
He later noted in his diary that all except one were
incorporated into the ordinance.

Unfortunately, this is

the only concrete evidence for Cutler's role in the
ordinance.

Cutler's contribution may be justifiably

narrowed to those portions of the ordinance not borrowed
from earlier drafts.

This elimination, coupled with his

role in S h a y s 's Rebellion, points toward the contract
clause.

The qualifying phrase "ought not" used to

introduce this section may be explained by Congress'
reluctance to fully adopt Cutler's suggestion.

It is also

possible that Cutler had some input into the third Article.
However, both Articles Two and Three may also be
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attributable to Dane, likewise from the Bay State and
equally familiar with both S h a ys 's Rebellion and the
importance New Englanders placed on virtuous behavior.21
Article ill.

"Religion, morality,

and knowledge, being

necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged."

This article, together with the Land

Ordinance of 1785, gave public education a solid foundation
in the territory.

The "rights, property, and liberty" of

the Indians are also protected, except in the case of "just
and lawful wars authorized by Congress."

While expressing

a republican ideal, this last passage is probably primarily
indicative of Congr es s' concern for the prevention of
costly and inopportune wars.
It is because of the Land Ordinance that both sections
of this article were functional.

Not only did that

ordinance reserve Section 16 of each township for the
support of education, but it also decreased Indian/white
conflict through separation.

By requiring that lands be

surveyed prior to settlement, the Land Ordinance put a
brake on unchecked immigration, thereby lessening the
pressure on Indian lands.
Article IV.

The territory and those states formed from

it were to be permanent members of the Union, with all the
rights and responsibilities such membership entailed.

As

equal'members of the Union, new states would be required to
honor their share of the national debt.

Taxation of
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federal property was forbidden, and absentee landowners
were protected from being taxed at a higher rate than
resident land owners.

All navigable streams and portages

between them were reserved for public use in perpetuity.
Article V.

The number of new states was limited to

between three and five, with boundaries corresponding
roughly to modern state boundaries.

At both the state and

territorial levels governments were required to be
republican and were also bound to uphold the principles of
the Articles of Compact.

Statehood was guaranteed once the

territory achieved of population of 60,000, though Congress
could elect to allow an earlier admission if it were deemed
in the interests of the Confederation to do so.

Large

territories would meet the minimum requirements much sooner
than the smaller territories stipulated by the Ordinance of
1784.
Article VI.

Slavery and involuntary servitude were

prohibited except as a punishment of crimes.

Fugitives--

presumably this applied primarily to escaped slaves--could
be "lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to" their place of
legal servitude.
Historians have thoroughly debated this article.
origins, purpose,
into question.

Its

and effectiveness have all been called

Nathan Dane, the man responsible for its

last-minute addition, was amazed at its easy acceptance.
He was not, however, the originator of the idea.^2
Jefferson was the first to propose that slavery be
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eventually banned in the West.

And if Dane's Article VI is

compared with Jefferson's earlier clause from the Ordinance
of 1784, the two are remarkably similar.
easier to enumerate their differences.

It is, in fact,
Jefferson's clause

restricted slavery throughout the national domain after the
year 1800.

Dane's appeared to take effect immediately but

was limited to the Northwest Territory.

Only the 1787

document provided for the return of fugitives.

Beyond

this, Dane's Article VI was taken almost word for word from
the earlier ordinance.
The legal expertise of Dane may be called into question
by the haphazard manner with which the slavery clause was
attached to the Ordinance of 1787.

Conflicting language in

the remainder of the ordinance was not removed.

No

provision was made for the enforcement of the anti-slavery
clause, nor was any indication given who would be
responsible for its enforcement.23
Still, there remains the seemingly inexplicable
southern support for this clause.

Slavery was important in

the South of 17 87 though it was not unique to that region,
nor was it yet the crucial litmus test of sectional
identity that it would become in later years.

Sectional

issues of the Revolutionary era were usually framed in
terms of commercial and producing states.

The West, as a

potential agricultural region, was thus considered a
natural ally of the plantation South.

With the West

already inclined to support the South because of this
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common bond, Southerners were willing to restrict slavery
as a means of lessening competition in staple agricultural
products such as tobacco and hemp.24
protected by the "fugitive" clause.

Slaveowners were
While the Northwest

was to be a free territory, Congress did not intend it to
become a haven for runaway slaves.

The Ordinance of 1787 was intended to provide "for the
government of the Territory of the United States northwest
of the River Ohio."
judged a success.

For that limited purpose it must be
The development of the old northwest

surpassed all expectations of the time.

The ordinance was

also successful beyond the bounds of the territory for
which it was initially prescribed.

With modifications, the

principles of the ordinance were used in the governance of
all United States territories until the Civil War.
Ultimately, the most important provision of the ordinance
was its well-defined program for the eventual inclusion of
territories within the union as full and equal members.
Jefferson's philosophy of letting the needs of the West
determine western policy was never seriously considered by
the national government, though it did help modify the more
conservative opinions of such men as Washington.
of Monroe were far more typical.

The views

While his perspective

changed with time, Monroe's ideal western program was
always determined by the needs of the East, particularly
his home state of Virginia.

Fortunately for the West, men

such as Jefferson, Monroe, and Washington, were in favor
new states in the West.
The western problem faced by the early republic was
twofold.

How was the west to be secured?

And how was

Congress to assure that a west thus secured would be a
positive addition, rather than a hindrance, to the Union
A policy that combined firm control with the republican
principles of self-government was the ideal answer.
ordinance achieved this balance in its coupling of
temporary and permanent measures.

Together with the

Constitution, the Ordinance of 1787 made possible the
continental expansion of the United States.

The
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1Of these thirteen men, four, Thomas Jefferson, James
Monroe, Edward Carrington, and Richard H. Lee, were
representatives of Virginia.
zThomas Jefferson, "Foundation . . . for a Government
Truly Republican," in Adrienne Koch, e d ., The American
Enlightenment: The Shaping of the American Experiment and a
Free Society (New York, 1965), 300.
^Marshall Dee Harris, Origin of the Land Tenure System
in the United States (Ames, Iowa, 1953), 61, 198, 319-320.
4The Committee consisting of Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Pinckney, Mr. Smith, Mr. Dane, and Mr. Henry . . . submit
the following report to the consideration of Congress. . .
(New York, 17 86) .
5I b i d .
6Jay A. Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787
(New York, 1891), 55-56.
7Nathan Dane to Daniel Webster, March 26, 1830, in
Charles M. Wiltse, e d ., The Papers of Daniel W e b st er , 15
v o l s . to date (Hanover, N.H, 1974- ), III, Correspondence,
1830-1834, 43-48.
In this same letter Dane claimed that he
was the "framer of the celebrated ordinance."
As the "only
member of Congress living who had any concern in forming"
the ordinance, his claim was unchallenged.
But his role
should be understood in the same manner as the carpenter
who frames a house while following the blueprint of others.
Dane deflated the importance of Jefferson’s "meagre,
inadequate plan of '84." Monroe fared no better.
Not only
is he not mentioned, but Dane dismissed his plan of
government as "not important."
Most significant, Dane
failed to acknowledge the guiding principles of both
Virginians that were incorporated into the Ordinance of
1787.
Ultimately, Dane's claim rests on the fact that he
literally wrote the final draft.
In his letter to Webster
he stated that he "never claimed originality, except in
regard to the clause against impairing contracts, & perhaps
the Indian article, [and] part of the 3d article."
^Clarence Edwin Carter, e d ., Territorial Papers of the
United States, (Washington, D.C., 1934- ), II, 40-41.
9The Virginia Cession of Territory Northwest of the
Ohio [March 1, 1784]," in Boyd, e d ., Jefferson Papers, VI,
578-579.
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10Terms of office were two years for representatives,
three years for the governor, four years for the
territorial secretary, and five years for the Council.
Judges were appointed for life.
All appointed officials
were subject to congressional recall.
11James Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in Boyd,
e d ., Jefferson P apers, IX, 511.
12All quotations within descriptions are taken from
the appropriate article of the ordinance.
13William Waller Hening, e d ., The Statutes at Large:
Being a Collection of all of the Laws of Virginia
(Richmond, Va., 1821), IX, 553.
14A s a member of Congress, Dane believed it improper
for him to speak out too strongly on what was, strictly
speaking, a state affair.
"He alluded," however, "to the
late commotions" in Massachusetts and expressed a desire
"to see the government again restored to its former
firmness and order." (Nathan Dane, "Address Before the
Massachusetts House of Representatives" [Nov. 9, 1786], in
Burnett, e d ., Letters of the Members of the Continental
Congress, VIII, 504-505.
See also, Dane to Thomas Dwight,
March 12, 1787, i b i d ., VIII, 556.)
15William Pynchon, Thomas Stebbins, Reuben Bliss, and
Thomas Williston to Samuel Lyman [Springfield
representative to the General Court], as quoted in David
Szatmary, "Shays' Rebellion in Springfield," in Michael F.
Konig and Martin Kaufman, eds., Springfield, 1636-1986
(Springfield, Mass., 1987), 53.
16Steven R. Boyd, "The Contract Clause and the
Evolution of American Federalism," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3d Ser., XLIV (1987), 534.
17Manasseh Cutler to Winthrop Sargent, Oct. 6, 1786,
as quoted in David Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making
of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst, Mass., 1982), 72.
18I b i d ., 89.
1^Ibid.,
1 78 7, 46.

86; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of

20Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the
United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New
York, 1950), 355-56.
21Dane claimed authorship of these two articles.
However, in light of their late addition to the ordinance
it is possible that Dane added them at Cutler's insistence.
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It is also possible that Cutler pressed for the
reintroduction of the ban on slavery found in Article VI.
See note 7 above.
22Dane to Webster, March 26, 1830, in wiltse, ed.,
Webster P apers, III, 43-48.
While Dane acknowledged
Jefferson's attempt to exclude slavery after 1800, he
failed to note that it would have applied to all the West,
including the cessions of south of the Ohio, where Dane
himself voted to admit slavery.
22If these basic problems were solved there still
remained the problem of funding the clause's enforcement.
See Paul Finkelman "Slavery and Bondage in the 'Empire of
Liberty,'" in Frederick D. Williams, e d ., The Northwest
Ordinance: Essays on its Formulation, Provisions, and
Legacy (East Lansing, Mich., 1988), 72-77.
24William Grayson to Monroe, Aug. 8, 1787, in Burnett,
e d ., Letters of the Members of the Contintental Congress,
VIII, 631.
See also Drew McCoy, "James Madison and Visions
of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A
Regional Perspective," in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein,
and Edward C. Carter, II, e d s ., Beyond Confederation:
Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity
(Chapel Hill, N . C . , 1987), 236-237, and Peter S. Onuf,
Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance,
(Bloomington, Ind., 1977), 111-113.
As noted in the
Introduction, it has been argued that this article was part
of a sectional trade-off.
See Staughton Lynd, "The
Compromise of 17 87," in Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and
the United States Constitution (Indianapolis, Ind., 1967),
185-213.
In return for northern support of the threefifths clause of the Constitution, southern delegates at
the Confederation Congress agreed to the banning of slavery
in the Northwest Territory.
Lynd finds support for this
possibility in a reference in Manasseh Cutler's diary to a
certain Mr. Hamilton.
Assuming this was Alexander
Hamilton, Lynd suggests that these two men engineered a
sectional compromise that also served the needs of the Ohio
Company.
The inexplicable nature of southern support for a
ban on slavery also lends weight to L y n d 's hypothesis.
However, to suggest that southern sectionalism has always
been grounded in advancing the sphere of slave labor is to
allow the powerful arguments of the nineteenth century to
intrude into a time when their validity is more easily
challenged.
Sectionalism was present, and slavery was
often a part of sectional differences.
But as Drew McCoy
has ably argued, it was not the critical factor in
sectional identification.
(McCoy, "Madison and Visions of
American Nationality," 236-237.)
Lynd does acknowledge other reasons for southern
support such as the fear of competition from the
agricultural produce of the Northwest and the implicit
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guarantee of slavery's protection in the Southwest.
Drew
McCoy considers these latter points more important than the
possible compromise.
He contends that the crucial
difference was between the "carrying states" of New England
and agrarian remainder of the nation.
Within this scheme
the agricultural West would naturally ally itself with the
agricultural South.
Both arguments highlight the
importance of eastern sectional politics in determining
western policy.
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